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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE
FISCAL CRISIS IN NEW YORK CITY:
COOPERATION FOR SURVIVAL
ARVID ANDERSON
MARJORIE A. LONDON

*
**

I. Introduction
In 1975, New York City was on the verge of bankruptcy. The city's
fiscal crisis was blamed in part on the collective bargaining process
and there was a real question as to whether the process would survive.
In an extraordinary rescue effort, the state and federal governments
joined with the city administration, municipal labor unions, and the
business community to "save" the city.
The state legislature created the Municipal Assistance Corporation1
to market city securities and passed the Financial Emergency Act of
19752 which imposed a wage freeze on public employees. In 1978,
Congress enacted the New York City Loan Guarantee Act, 3 providing
federal loan guarantees to the city. This legislation engendered increased state and federal government involvement in the city's affairs
by mandating that state and federal agencies monitor collective bargaining between the city and its- employees.4 The city's financial
predicament also required increased cooperation in the public sector

* Chairman, New York City Office of Collective Bargaining. B.A. 1946, LLB.
1948, University of Wisconsin.
** Executive Assistant to the Chairman, New York City Office of Collective
Bargaining. B.A. 1970, Mount Holyoke College. J.D. 1979, Fordham University.

1. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3033 (McKinney 1981).
2. Ch. 868, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1405 (McKinney). See notes 6-23 infra and accompanying text.
3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1521-1531 (Supp. III 1979). See notes 46-49 infra and accompanying text.
4. Committee on Labor and Employment Law, The Impact of the Fiscal Crisis
and State and Federal Remedial Legislation on the Structure and Scope of Collective

Bargainingin New York City, 34

RECORD OF

N.Y.C.B.A. 754, 763 (1979) [hereinafter

cited as Committee Report]. This article is the last of a series of three on the subject of
the fiscal crisis and collective bargaining in New York City. The first two articles
appear at 31 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 386 (1976), and at 32 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 462
(1977), respectively. The presence of state and federal agencies in the city's bargaining process has raised certain questions about who the real employer is. See Weitzman, The Effect of Economic Restraints on Public-Sector Collective Bargaining: The
Lessons of New York City, 2 EMPL. REL. L.J. 286, 291, 293 (1977).
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between labor and management. The survival of the city as well as the
collective bargaining process necessitated compromise and conciliation and an abandonment of the traditionally adversarial relationship
between the city and the unions. For example, the unions agreed to
wage increase deferrals and accepted new cost saving programs for
increasing productivity and the efficient delivery of public services.
Most significantly, the unions agreed to commit employee pension
fund contributions to the purchase of Municipal Assistance Corporation securities when no one else would buy the city's bonds. 5 In
exchange, the city agreed to give labor a share in the savings it would
realize from productivity-enhancing measures, including cost of living
adjustments.
As a result of the cooperation among government, labor and private
enterprise, the city has survived the fiscal crisis. Collective bargaining
too has survived-but with significant changes. This Article discusses
the changes in bargaining laws and practices which have emerged as a
result of the fiscal crisis, such as productivity bargaining and gainsharing, coalition bargaining, the use of salary review panels, and the
emergence of the city's ability to pay as a major factor in public sector
bargaining. The impact of the fiscal crisis on unions and the
workforce is examined, including the effect on job security and manning levels, and the introduction of new concepts in city government
and labor relations.
II. Changes in Bargaining Laws and Practices
as a Result of the Fiscal Crisis
A. Changes in the Law
In response to a deepening New York City fiscal crisis, New York
State established the Municipal Assistance Corporation in June, 1975,6
as a special agency with power to market securities. In September, the
state legislature passed the Financial Emergency Act of 1975 (FEA),7
declaring a financial emergency in the City of New York," creating the
Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB) 9 which was given the
power to supervise and control the city's financial affairs and imposing a wage freeze on public employees.1 0 One section of the FEA
5. See N.Y. REiRIE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 179(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82); see also
ch. 868 [1975] N.Y. Laws 1421 as amended by ch. 870 [1975] N.Y. Laws 1452
(McKinney).
6. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3033 (McKinney 1981).
7. Ch. 868, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1405 (McKinney).
8. Id.§ 1.

9. Id. § 5.

10. Id. §§ 7-9, 10(1).
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specifically provided that "[n]othing contained in this act shall be
construed to impair the right of employees to organize or to bargain
collectively."'" However, the EFCB was required to approve all
collective bargaining agreements between the city and its employees
before they became effective,' 2 thus potentially affecting the outcome
of collective bargaining.
The impact of the FEA wage freeze provision was softened somewhat by another section of the act which exempted public employees
from the freeze if their representatives voluntarily agreed to accept a
deferral of wage increases.' 3 Most of the city's unions took advantage
of this provision and voluntarily entered into a wage deferral agreement with the city, agreeing to defer a six percent increase that
already had been negotiated for the second year of a two-year agreement.14 In exchange for the deferral, the city agreed that the amount
of the increase would be included in the salary rate during the period
of deferral for purposes of computing retirement benefits,' 5 and that
by June 30,
the employer would seek to repay the deferred increases
16
1978, if certain prescribed conditions had been met.
In June, 1978, amendments to the Financial Emergency Act, which
made a number of significant changes in the act, were signed into
law. 17 The Emergency Financial Control Board was renamed the

11. Id.§ 3(3).
12. Id. § 7(l)(e). Section 7(1)(h) empowered the Emergency Financial Control
Board to "issue ... such orders as it deems necessary to accomplish the purposes of
this act."
13. Id. § 10(2).
14. See Wage Deferral Agreement entered into on Oct. 9, 1975 between the City
of New York and other public employers and various unions, including District
Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; City Employees Union, Local 237; I.B.T.; and
Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association, Local 831, I.B.T. [hereinafter cited as Wage
Deferral Agreement]. Depending upon an employee's salary level, two, four or the
entire six percent increase was deferred for a period of one year. Without the
agreement to defer payment of the negotiated increase, as much as six percent of the
workforce would have been laid off. Id. Art. II, Sec. 1.
15. Wage Deferral Agreement, supra note 14, Art. II, Sec. 3.
16. Id. Art. 1II, Sec. 1. These conditions were: (1) that the city have a balanced
budget; (2) that the city be able to sell its obligations in the then prevailing market;
and (3) that the amount of the repayment not exceed the amount accrued to the
credit of an Employer Deferral Liability Account consisting of savings resulting from
productivity improvements and employee attrition. Id. Sec. 4. The repayment date
has been extended to July 1, 1982 or "whenever thereafter the stated conditions are
met," because of an award rendered by the three impartial members of the Board of
Collective Bargaining serving as an arbitration panel in Coalition Unions v. City of
New York, No. A-743-78/I-141-78, slip op. at 44 (Office of Collective Bargaining,
July 20, 1978), in accordance with the dispute resolution provisions of Article X of
the Wage Deferral Agreement.
17. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 5401-5420 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1981-82) (Ch.
201 [1978] N.Y. Laws 391-435 (McKinney)).
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Financial Control Board (FCB) and its term was extended until the
year 2008, thus giving the board a more permanent role in New York
City affairs.' 8 The amendments also imposed a new criterion to which
impasse panels had to accord substantial weight in rendering awards:
the city's "financial ability . . . to pay the cost of any increase in
wages or fringe benefits without requiring an increase in the level of
city taxes existing at the time of the commencement of [the impasse
proceeding]."' 9 The 1978 amendments provide that the Board of
Collective Bargaining, 20 when reviewing an impasse panel award
providing for an increase in wages or fringe benefits, shall make a
threshold determination of the financial ability of the city to pay the
cost of such increases 2' and that at the request of any party to the
impasse proceedings, the Appellate Division, First Department of the
New York Supreme Court, shall review de novo the threshold deter-

18. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 5418 (McKinney 1979). The 1978 amendments to the
FEA (1978 FEA) provide for the suspension of the Financial Control Board's functions prior to the year 2008 provided that at that time there are no federal loan
guarantees outstanding and that the city's expense budget has been balanced for
three consecutive years in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Id. § 5402(12).
19. Id. §§ 5408(3)(a), (h). Under the New York Collective Bargaining Law (NYCCBL), NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 (1975 & Supp. 1981-82), disputes
arising from contract negotiations may be submitted to an impasse panel. Id. § 11737.0(c). An impasse is found to exist if the parties agree that an impasse exists and if
the Director of the Office of Collective Bargaining, see note 20 infra, is persuaded
that it exists. An impasse also may be found to exist if the Board of Collective
Bargaining determines, upon the request of one party and after an investigation by
the director, that an impasse has been reached. The parties select one or three
individuals to serve as an impasse panel, chosen from a register of neutrals approved
by the city and labor members of the Board of Collective Bargaining. The NYCCBL
authorizes impasse panels to mediate some or all of the issues in dispute. If the
mediation efforts are unsuccessful, the panel is authorized to conduct hearings, take
testimony and make findings and recommendations. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
ch. 54 § 1173-7.0(c). See also Impasse Under the NYCCBL, Office of Collective
Bargaining, City of New York 1-3.
20. The Board of Collective Bargaining is one of two boards which carry out the
functions of the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB), an impartial
adjudicative agency which administers the New York Collective Bargaining Law
(NYCCBL), NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 (1975). The NYCCBL governs
matters concerning union representation and certification and the collective bargaining process including the duty to bargain, arbitration of grievances and the resolution
of contract impasses. The Board of Collective Bargaining, composed of two city
representatives, two labor representatives and three impartial members, adjudicates
all matters before the OCB except those regarding certification of union members,
which are decided by the three impartial members who comprise the Board of
Certification. Structure and Functions of the OCB, Office of Collective Bargaining,
City of New York 1-3.
21. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 5408(3)(b) (McKinney 1979).
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mination of the city's financial ability to pay. 22 The FCB may intervene, however, as a party on the issue of ability to pay and appear
before an impasse panel, before the Board of Collective Bargaining, or
23
before a reviewing court.
The constitutionality of the wage freeze provision of the FEA was
challenged and upheld by the New York courts. The Patrolmen's
Benevolent Association (PBA), in Patrolmen's Benevolent Association
v. City of New York, 24 alleged that the provision violated the contract
clause of the United States Constitution. 25 The litigation arose out of
a dispute between the city and the PBA 26 in which the city refused to
implement a six percent wage increase that had been awarded to the
PBA by an impasse panel2 7 and confirmed by court judgment prior to
the enactment of the FEA.2 8 Both the state supreme court and the
appellate division 29 avoided the constitutional issues raised by the PBA
and found that the wage freeze provisions of the FEA, while applicable to collective bargaining agreements and to impasse panel
awards, 30 did not preclude the enforcement of an award which had

22. Id. § 5408(3)(e). The 1978 FEA's provision for substantive review of the
threshold determination is a departure from the usual role of the courts in the area of
labor-management relations. Generally, in labor relations matters, courts prefer to
rely upon the determinations of neutrals who have been selected by the parties and
who possess special expertise in labor matters. In City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 41
N.Y.2d 764, 364 N.E.2d 817, 396 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1977), which predates the "ability to
pay" amendments of the 1978 FEA, a dispute arose over the terms of an agreement
between the city and its police officer union. The dispute was submitted to an
impasse panel which was required to consider the city's ability to pay pursuant to the
Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAW § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). The New York
Court of Appeals, reversing the intermediate appellate court, held that the findings
on the issue of ability to pay were within the province of the panel and that judicial
review must be limited to determining whether these findings were arbitrary and
capricious. Rinaldo, 41 N.Y.2d at 766, 364 N.E.2d at 818, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
23. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 5408(3)(g) (McKinney 1979).
24. 41 N.Y.2d 205, 359 N.E.2d 1338, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1976).
25. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10 ("No state shall ... pass any . . . Law impairing the
).
Obligation of Contracts ....
26. The PBA was one of the unions which had refused to sign a voluntary wage
deferral agreement with the city. 32 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 462 (1977).
27. City of New York v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n., No. 1-115-74 (Office of
Collective Bargaining, Apr. 30, 1975) (Coulson, Gellhorn, Stein, Arbs.).
28. 41 N.Y.2d at 206, 359 N.E.2d at 1339, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
29. 52 A.D.2d 43, 46, 382 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (1st Dep't 1976).
30. In a separate matter involving contract negotiations in 1976 between the city
and the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the District Attorney's offices, the
New York Supreme Court specifically held that impasse panels, as part of the
collective bargaining process, are subject to the wage freeze provisions of the FEA.
The court noted that section 7 of the FEA provides that wage controls apply to
"collective bargaining agreements or other analagous contracts." Higgins v. Anderson, 97 L.R.R.M. 2481, 2482 (1977).
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been reduced to judgment. 31 The court of appeals affirmed, holding
that the language of the wage freeze provision was not intended to be
32
used to suspend a court judgment.
In Subway-Surface Supervisors' Association v. New York City
Transit Authority, 33 the New York Court of Appeals expressly upheld
the constitutionality of the FEA wage freeze provision. Although the
34
court recognized that the wage freeze impaired contract rights, it
found that the provision did not violate the contract clause of the
United States Constitution. 35 In so holding, the court relied on the
well-settled rule that the "State, in the exercise of its police power,
may override the provisions of a contract when the impairment is
36
It
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."
was undisputed, said the court, that the alleviation of the fiscal crisis
' 37
served "an important public purpose.
The court found the imposition of the wage freeze on the employees
of the Transit Authority to be necessary to the achievement of a public
purpose because millions of dollars would be saved. 38 The wage
freeze provision was deemed reasonable because it "effected a limited
intrusion on the contract rights petitioner had secured for the employees represented by it under the collective bargaining agreement; there
was neither termination of existing employment nor deprivation of
39
payment for services that had been rendered in the past."
31. 41 N.Y.2d at 207-08, 359 N.E.2d at 1340, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
32. Id. at 208, 359 N.E.2d at 1340-41, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
33. 44 N.Y.2d 101, 375 N.E.2d 384, 404 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1978). See also Committee
of Interns and Residents v. City of New York. 87 Misc. 2d 504, 386 N.Y.S.2d 177
(1976) (FEA wage freeze provision was a reasonable exercise of state's police power
and did not impair plaintiffs' collective bargaining agreement, deprive plaintiffs of
property without just compensation, violate the Bankruptcy and Supremacy Clauses
of the Federal Constitution, undermine petitioners' right to bargain collectively, or
deny to petitioners equal protection of the law.).
34. 44 N.Y.2d at 113, 375 N.E.2d at 391, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 330,
35. See note 25 supra.
36. 44 N.Y.2d at 109, 375 N.E.2d at 388, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 328, citing United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). See also Home Bldg. and Loan
Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934) ("[t]he economic interests of the State
may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts"). Public contracts are construed strictly in
favor of the state as a general rule. See B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 230 (2d
ed. 1979).
37. 44 N.Y.2d at 110, 375 N.E.2d at 389, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
38. Id. at 111-12, 375 N.E.2d at 389-90, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 329. The court also
noted that some deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity
isappropriate when legislation impairing public contracts is at issue. Id. at 112, 375
N.E.2d at 390, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
39. Id. at 113, 375 N.E.2d at 390, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 330. The petitioner, as
bargaining representative of several classes of personnel employed by the Transit
Authority, also challenged the wage freeze legislation as an unconstitutional impair--
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The 1978 amendments to the FEA were challenged by the PBA in
DeMilia v. State of New York, 4 0 on the grounds that they violated the
equal protection clauses of both the United States 4I and New York
State 42 Constitutions. Specifically, the PBA alleged that the FEA
ment of the right to pension benefits protected by N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7, and as a
denial of equal protection of the laws under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 11. The court promptly disposed of the pension benefit issue noting
that, pursuant to a wage deferral agreement with the Transit Authority entered into
by the petitioner on March 10, 1977, pension benefits were computed as though the
deferred wage increases had been paid, see notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text,
and, therefore the wage freeze provision did not affect pension benefits. Since no
impairment of the right to pension benefits occurred, the court remitted the case to
special term for dismissal of the petition insofar as it sought a judgment that the FEA
violated article 5, § 7 of the N.Y. State Constitution. 44 N.Y.2d at 108-09, 375
N.E.2d at 388, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 327-28. With respect to the equal protection claim,
the court rejected the petitioners' argument that the FEA gave bondholders a preferred position over that of employees subject to the wage freeze. The court stated
that even if it were to accept the petitioner's argument that the rights of bond and
note holders were unaffected by the wage freeze while employees were deprived of
future wage increases, it nonetheless would find no denial of equal protection. Id. at
114, 375 N.E.2d at 391, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 331. There is a significant difference, said
the court, between the "impairment of governmental obligations arising out of
contracts under which the engagement of the other contracting party is still executory and impairment of those arising out of contracts fully performed." Id. Moreover, the court stated that the differentiation might be a valid exercise of legislative
discretion, considering that the impairment of the right of bond holders to payment
would have a significantly greater impact on governmental operations than the
impairment of the right of employees to wage increases.
A default by the city on its promises to its lenders might be expected to
have consequences affecting the ability of the city to obtain funds for the
performance of its governmental functions well into the future and in a
scope far broader than might be expected to attend the imposition of a
suspension of wage increase payments.
Id. However, while the court of appeals has permitted the city to avoid contractual
obligations for the payment of wages, it has not permitted the city to ignore its nonwage contractual obligations. In Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp.,
40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976), the court struck down the
New York State Emergency Moratorium Act for the City of New York, ch. 874 [1976]
N.Y. Laws 22 (McKinney), which barred actions to enforce the city's short-term
obligations for three years, as unconstitutional under N.Y. Const. art. VIII, § 2. The
full faith and credit provision of the state constitution prohibits the city from contracting any indebtedness unless it pledges its "faith and credit" for the payment of
the principal and interest of the indebtedness. Id. This pledge, said the court,
constitutes both a promise to pay and a promise to use in good faith the city's revenue
powers to raise the funds to pay. 40 N.Y.2d at 735, 358 N.E.2d at 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d
at 25. The Emergency Moratorium Act permitted the city to ignore its pledge, and
since the constitutional requirement was designed specifically to protect rights which
would be vulnerable in times of financial constraint, the court found the Act unconstitutional. Id. at 732-33, 36, 358 N.E.2d at 850, 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 24, 26.
40. 96 Misc. 2d 77, 412 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. N.Y., County 1978), modified, 72
A.D.2d 536, 421 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1st Dep't 1979), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 611, 425
N.Y.S.2d 1027, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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amendments placed it in a different position than other police organizations in the state since state police unions are not subject to the
"ability to pay" amendment of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (NYCCBL). 43 The Supreme Court, New York County rejected the PBA's equal protection claims noting that the NYCCBL
impasse procedures apply to all municipal unions in New York
City. 44 Further, the court found that the classification distinctions
between New York City and upstate police were reasonable and
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, thus complying with
45
equal protection requirements.
In 1978, the same year that the FEA amendments were passed, the
United States Congress enacted the New York City Loan Guarantee
Act, 46 providing federal loan guarantees to the city. These guarantees
are subject to strict conditions, one of which is that the city establish a
joint labor management productivity council to "develop and seek to
implement methods for enhancing the productivity of the city's labor
force." 47 The act mandates that a representative of the Financial
Control Board serve as an observer to the productivity council 4 and
that the board report annually on the operations of the council to the
49
United States Secretary of the Treasury and to the public.
A joint labor management productivity council was created by
executive order of the Mayor of New York City in 1979. 50 While the
51
productivity council has been criticized for a lack of effectiveness,

43. 96 Misc. 2d at 82, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 957. Police unions outside New York City
are subject to the impasse procedures of the Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209
(McKinney Supp. 1981-82), which contain no specific "ability to pay" restrictions.
44. 96 Misc. 2d at 83, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
45. Id., 412 N.Y.S.2d at 957-58.
46. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1521-1531 (Supp. III 1979).
47. Id. § 1523(9).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Office of the Mayor, The City of New York, Exec. Order No. 28 (Jan. 26,
1979). Later the same year, a second executive order was issued restructuring the
Productivity Council to reflect structural changes in the Mayor's Office. Office of the
Mayor, The City of New York, Exec. Order No. 37 (Nov. 15, 1979). As presently
constituted, the council includes Deputy Mayor for Operations Nathan Leventhal
(Chairman), Director of the Office of Municipal Labor Relations Bruce Mclver, City
Personnel Director Juan Ortiz, and three representatives of the Municipal Labor
Committee (a coalition of municipal labor organizations). In addition, as mandated
by the New York City Loan Guarantee Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1523(9) (Supp. III 1979), a
representative of the Financial Control Board acts as an observer and attends all
meetings of the Council.
51. See New York City Productivity Council, Staff Report of New York State
Financial Control Board, 3 (Jan. 15, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Staff Report]. Bruce
Mclver, a city representative on the Council, conceded that "[t]he deliberation of the
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the council made considerable progress in the fiscal year 1981. It
instituted such productivity-enhancing programs as alternative work
schedules, work place improvements, and payroll/timekeeping im52
provements.
B. Changes in Bargaining Practices
1. Productivity Bargaining
As a result of the fiscal crisis, the city has been forced to take a hard
look at the productivity of its work force 53 and determine where
improvements can be made. Productivity has become an important
element in the collective bargaining process and, in some instances,
has become a prerequisite for wage increases and continued employment. In 1976, pursuant to the wage freeze legislation then in effect as
part of the FEA, the FCB issued wage and salary policies limiting
wage increases to cost of living adjustments and providing that these

Productivity Council have [sic] produced little in the way of programmatic initiatives ...." Letter from Bruce McIver to Comer Coppie, Executive Director of the
Financial Control Board (Nov. 29, 1979), reprintedin Staff Report, supra at App. C.
52. New York City Office of the Deputy Mayor for Operations, The Mayor's
ManagementReport at 22 (Sept. 17, 1981). The Mayor's report on the New York City
Productivity Program to the Financial Control Board, dated September 17, 1980,
detailed some of the productivity improvements achieved through collective bargaining in the areas of crew size reduction, broadbanding and work assignments. New
York City Office of the Deputy Mayor for Operations, Productivity Program for New
York City at 18 (Sept. 17, 1980). For a discussion of broadbanding, see notes 172-92
infra and accompanying text.
53. Productivity has been defined as the relationship between defined units of
output (physical product or service performed) per level of input (employees, raw
materials or equipment). Increases in productivity can be realized either by raising
the level of output for a given level of input (more or better services performed per
worker) or by decreasing the level of input (reducing the number of workers while
maintaining the same quality and quantity of services). However, unlike the private
sector where inputs and outputs can be easily quantified, in the public sector the
units of productivity are difficult to define and may be impossible to measure with
precision. The feasibility of measuring productivity in the public sector varies, of
course, with the service involved. In the area of sanitation, for example, the level of
productivity can be determined by examining the number of employees (input) on a
shift and the tonnage of refuse collected per shift (output). Police and fire-fighting
services, by contrast, do not lend themselves to such objective measurement. Technical shortcomings of a public sector productivity program notwithstanding, efforts in
this area predate the fiscal crisis. A "Productivity Program" was announced first in
1972 in an effort to expand organizational improvements and managerial reforms
initiated during the administration of Mayor Lindsay. In 1974, the city's first Productivity Council was established to assist in the development of labor-management
committees at the agency level. This council was disbanded in 1975 at the onset of the
fiscal crisis. See Staff Report, supra note 51, at 3-5.
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increases were to be funded entirely by savings resulting from increased employee productivity.5 4
Wage increases during the fiscal crisis were not contingent solely
upon savings realized through improved employee productivity. For
example, the 1978 coalition economic agreement provided two annual
increases of four percent. 55 More recently, through a process known
as gainsharing, 5 employees have negotiated wage incentives in return
for their acceptance of new programs for delivering public services.
While management might have argued that changes in the method of
delivering city services are a management prerogative, it sometimes
has found it more advantageous to bargain over such changes. For
example, the city voluntarily entered into negotiations with the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association concerning an incentive program
for acceptance by the union of a new side-loading two-man truck to
replace the traditional three-man vehicle. 57 The Deputy Mayor for
Operations, Nathan Leventhal, explained that the city agreed to discuss the use of the two-man trucks "in recognition of the fact that it
would have been difficult to take advantage of such a technological
advance without broad agreement.- 58 The union, in turn, agreed to
discuss the introduction of the trucks despite concerns about the effects on the health and safety of its members because it feared that
other more burdensome measures, such as the use of private carters,
59
might be employed to improve productivity.
When negotiations about the two-man truck broke down, the city
and the sanitation union agreed to submit the issue to an impasse
panel. The recommendations of the panel, 60 which were accepted by
both parties, provided that sanitation workers be paid an $11 differen-

54. These policies were in effect for slightly more than two years and were
applicable to all collective bargaining agreements between the city and municipal
unions. Id. at 6.
55. Coalition Economic Agreement, June 5, 1978, at 9-10. See notes 74-76 infra
and accompanying text.
56. According to Philip Caruso, President of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, the concept of gainsharing is the product of "the fertile imagination of Jack
Bigel," consultant to a number of municipal unions. Caruso, Productivity and Gainsharing, Chief-Leader, Mar. 27, 1981, at 4, col. 4.
57. City and Sanitation Union to Arbitrate Truck Issue, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
1980, at B3, col. 5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. City of New York v. Uniformed Sanitationmen's Ass'n, Local 831, No. 1-15780 (Office of Collective Bargaining, Dec. 10, 1980) (Kelly, Arb.).
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tial for each shift worked on a two-man truck. 6' The differential was
provided with the understanding that there would be "one-for-one
replacement" of the three-man trucks with the new vehicles, 62 and
was contingent further upon meeting or approximating prior levels of
productivity in the Sanitation Department. 63 According to the Department, the savings to be realized from this program would result
primarily from a reduction in manning through attrition.6 4 The
Sanitation Commissioner estimated that eventually 300 jobs could be
eliminated without lay offs because of two-man6 5 trucks and that this
program would save the city $7 million a year.
Other municipal unions have expressed interest in negotiating financial incentives in return for their acceptance of work rule changes
that will lead to increased productivity. 6 For example, the city
entered into negotiations with the PBA concerning expanding the use
67
of one-man patrol cars in exchange for additional compensation.
However, unlike the sanitation union, the PBA sought financial benefits for all police officers, not only those who actually patrol in one-

61. Id., slip op. at 10, 14.
62. Id., slip op. at 11, 15.
63. On May 15, 1981, the city withheld the $11 bonus from the paychecks of 55
sanitation workers who had fallen short of trash collection goals. In response, the
affected sanitationmen instituted a job slowdown. When the two sides could not
settle their dispute over the precise goals sanitationmen were supposed to meet to
qualify for the differential, it was submitted to a three-man dispute resolution panel.
This was in accordance with the impasse panel's award in City of New York v.
Uniformed Sanitationmen's Ass'n Local 831, No. 1-157-80, slip op. at 11-12, 15. The
three-man dispute panel worked out a system for monitoring performance standards
on the two-man trucks, which standards vary according to the sanitation district in
which the new trucks are used. However, essentially the same amount of work done
by a three-man crew on the old trucks must be done by a two-man crew on the new
trucks to qualify for the $11 differential. See Accord Is Reached on Standards for
Two-Man Sanitation Trucks, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1981, at B6, col. 1.
64. $11 a Shift Extra is Recommended for 2-Man Truck, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1980, at B1, col. 6.
65. Sanitmen Want 6.5G to Operate New Trucks, Daily News, Dec. 1, 1980, at
50, col. 1.
66. The Sanitation Department has indicated that it is prepared to make some
form of incentive payment to sanitation officers if there are significant improvements
in productivity. Sanit. Officers Exploring Plan on Gainsharing, Chief-Leader, Oct.
2, 1981, at 5, col. 7. District Council 37 is discussing with the city the possibility of
paying a premium to motor vehicle operators who exceed the basic per shift quota for
automobiles towed away. Conversation between Arvid Anderson and Alan R. Viani,
Director of Research and Negotiations, District Council 37 on March 3, 1982.
67. City and Union Near Accord on One-Officer Patrol, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,
1981, at B3, col. 5.
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man cars. 68 In addition, the PBA demanded that safety measures be
69
instituted to provide extra protection to officers in solo patrol cars.
The introduction of the issue of productivity in the collective bargaining process has given rise to a new standard of accountability in
the public sector. Increasingly, bargaining for wage increases is contingent upon savings realized through the elimination of costly and
outdated work rules by the employer as well as greater output by
employees. Moreover, the need for increased productivity has required that labor and management engage in a cooperative effort. In
order to maintain acceptable levels of service to the public in periods
of fiscal austerity, the city depends upon the goodwill of its workforce;
further, it is to labor's advantage to cooperate with an employer who
otherwise might be forced to lay off more workers or to contract out
work to private enterprise.
2. Coalition Bargaining
As a result of the fiscal crisis, the collective bargaining process has
become increasingly centralized. More than 400 separate bargaining
units negotiated contracts with the city in 1968,70 but by 1976 the
number of units had been reduced to fewer than 100. 7 1 In the face of
threatened bankruptcy and the mandated review and control by external bodies of New York City's affairs, 72 municipal unions found
that they could enhance their position at the bargaining table by
further consolidating the structure of city negotiations. In 1975, the
concept of coalition bargaining was born when, on an informal basis,
the unions collectively negotiated a wage deferral agreement with the
73
city.
In 1978, municipal unions again bargained as a coalition for a twoyear collective bargaining agreement with the city. The combined
unions, representing approximately 200,000 municipal employees,

68. Id. Unlike sanitation, where only those who work on two-man trucks have an
increased workload, in police work the use of one-man patrols increases the burden
on officers patroling in two-man cars in the same precinct because the two-man cars
are the first-response units in emergencies, the solo patrols being used only as backups. In addition, one-man patrols are assigned to safer areas.
69. Id. As of this writing, the negotiations between the city and the PBA over oneman patrols have been deferred.
70. New York City Office of Collective Bargaining, Annual Report 1980, at 36.
71. Id. Since 1976, the number of bargaining units in New York City has been
reduced even further and presently stands at 79. New York City Office of Collective
Bargaining, Annual Report 1981, at 25.
72. See notes 6-23, 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
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were represented at the bargaining table by District Council 37 of the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the
United Federation of Teachers, Local 237 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association and
the Sergeants' Benevolent Association.74 The representatives of these
unions, as a committee, prepared an economic package for submission
to the city after approval by all other unions in the coalition. 75 Centralized bargaining pre-empted all economic items in the 1978 negotiations and resulted in the first coalition economic agreement. 7 6 Bargaining with respect to non-cost items continued at the unit level.77
One issue in the 1978 coalition negotiations led to a temporary
breakdown in bargaining: the repayment of the wage increases that
had been voluntarily deferred in 1975.78 The three impartial members of the Board of Collective Bargaining, serving as an arbitration/
impasse panel pursuant to the wage deferral agreement, held that the
city's obligation to repay the deferred increases continued. 7 The
panel concluded that the June 30, 1978 date for repayment was only

74. Committee Report, supra note 4, at 761. Police and firefighter unions declined
to participate in the coalition negotiations but later accepted the same economic
package negotiated by the coalition.
75. Victor Gotbaum, Executive Director of District Council 37 and Chairman of
the Municipal Labor Committee (MLC), recognizing that coalition bargaining
would be to everyone's advantage, observed that "[t]he city, being scrutinized by
Washington and the financial markets will benefit tremendously if we can avoid the
headlines and hassles that are usually involved when negotiations stretch out for
month after month with each union bargaining separately." Municipal Labor Committee, Press Release, at 2 (Feb. 9, 1978).
76. Coalition Economic Agreement, June 5, 1978.
77. See Lewin & McCormick, Coalition Bargaining in Municipal Government:
The New York City Experience, 34 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV. 175, 184 (1981).
78. The wage deferral agreement provided for repayment of the 160-200 million
dollars in deferred raises by June 30, 1978 if, by that date, the city had regained
financial stability. See Wage Deferral Agreement, supra note 14, Art. III. Both the
city and the coalition of unions acknowledged tht the conditions for repayment had
not been met in 1978. Committee Report, supra note 4, at 761, However, the unions
maintained that the city's obligation to repay the deferred moneys continued, while
the city argued that the raises had lapsed. Specifically, the unions contended that the
increases must be repaid whenever the required conditions were satisfied; that is,
whenever the city regained a balanced budget and the ability to re-enter normal
credit markets. The city's position was that, since fiscal recovery had not been
achieved by June 30, 1978, the obligation to repay the deferred raises was extinguished. In order not to deter a final agreement on the coalition pact, both parties
agreed to submit their dispute over the repayment issue to arbitration, as provided
for in the wage deferral agreement.
79. Coalition Unions v. City of New York, No. A-743-78/I-141-78, slip op. at 28,
43 (Office of Collective Bargaining, July 20, 1978) (Anderson, Eisenberg, Schmertz,
Arbs.).
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an estimate of the earliest date by which recovery conditions might
have been met.80 To avoid further disruption of the city's four-year
fiscal plan, however, the panel ruled that the increases did not have to
be paid before June 30, 1982, and that the conditions for repayment
would be carried forward.8 1
In the next round of bargaining for a 1980-82 "citywide" agreement, bargaining over economic items was conducted by two coalitions of unions, one comprised of uniformed forces and one of nonuniformed employee unions. 82 Pursuant to the Uniformed Coalition
Economic Agreement (UCEA), the uniformed forces received a
slightly higher wage increase than the non-uniformed forces in the
first year of the two-year agreement. 83 The uniformed forces historically have felt that they are entitled to be paid more than their nonuniformed counterparts. It is likely, therefore, that they will continue
84
to operate as a separate bargaining coalition.
Both coalition economic agreements for the 1980-82 period, the
UCEA and the Municipal Coalition Economic Agreement (MCEA),
carried forward from the 1978 coalition economic agreement the city's
obligation to repay the wage increases deferred in 1975. 15 They also
provided for the resolution of disputes by the three impartial members
of the Board of Collective Bargaining serving as an arbitration
panel,8 6 and further specified that no additional economic demands
80. Id. at 29.
81. Id. at 42, 45-46.
82. the "uniformed coalition" included the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association,
the Uniformed Firefighters Association, the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association,
the Correction Officers Benevolent Association, the Housing Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association, the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, the Transit Patrolmen's Benevolent Association and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association. The coalition of
municipal unions, the "non-uniformed coalition," consisted of twenty-five unions
including, inter alia, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the United Federation of Teachers, and Local 237, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The
coalition of municipal unions represented more than 200,000 city employees in
negotiations for a second coalition economic agreement. Serrin, A Lasting Uniformed
Coalition Planned, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1980, at B4, col. 4.
83. The MCEA provided for a general wage increase of the greater of 8 % or $900
effective the first day of the applicable separate unit agreement and for an additional
general increase of the greater of 8 % or $900 in the second year of the applicable unit
agreement. MCEA Sec. 6. The UCEA provided a rate increase of 9 % effective July 1,
1980 and an additional 8% effective July 1, 1981. UCEA, Sec. 5.
84. Serrin, A Lasting Uniformed Coalition Planned, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1980, at
B4, col. 4. A third municipal bargaining coalition has been established for the 198284 negotiations, consisting of superior officer groups in the city's uniformed departments. Superior Officer Group to Bargain as 3rd Coalition, Chief-Leader, Mar. 19,
1982 at 1, col. 2.
85. MCEA, Sec. 12; UCEA, Sec. 12.
86. MCEA, Sec. 11(a); UCEA, Sec. 11(a).
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could be made during the terms of the agreements.8 7 To date, there
have been two cases decided by the impartial members of the board
involving "additional economic demands." 8
The first of these disputes concerned a demand by the Detectives'
Endowment Association, the union representing police detectives in
the New York City Police Department.8 9 The union argued that the
100-hour limitation or "cap" on overtime duty for which detectives
may receive cash compensation should be eliminated. ° The city
contended that the union's demand would produce an additional cost
to the city and that such an additional "economic demand" or "further cost-related demand" was precluded under the terms of both
coalition economic agreements. 9 The panel agreed and rejected the
demand. 92 The second case arose from a demand by District Council
37 for additional salary adjustments for ambulance employees of the
Emergency Medical Service of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation. 93 The impartial members of the Board of Collective
Bargaining, serving as an impasse panel pursuant to the dispute resolution provision of the MCEA,94 rejected the union's demands as
"additional economic demands."' 95

87. MCEA, Sec. 3; UCEA, Sec. 3.
88. City of New York v. Detectives' Endowment Ass'n, No. A-1243-81 (Office of
Collective Bargaining, May 26, 1981) (Anderson, Collins, Eisenberg, Arbs.); City of
New York v. District Council 37, No. A-1302-81 (Office of Collective Bargaining,
Oct. 9, 1981) (Anderson, Collins, Eisenberg, Arbs.).
89. City of New York v. Detectives' Endowment Ass'n, No. A-1243-81 (Office of
Collective Bargaining, May 26, 1981) (Anderson, Collins, Eisenberg, Arbs.).
90. Id., slip op. at 3.
91. Id. at 3, 6. Although the Detectives' Endowment Association (DEA) participated in the negotiations of the nonuniformed coalition, along with other unions of
superior uniformed officers, including the Captains' Endowment Association, the
Lieutenants' Benevolent Association and the Sergeants' Benevolent Association, there
was an issue as to whether the DEA agreed to the terms of the MCEA or to those of
the UCEA. However, both agreements expressly provided that they were intended to
cover "all economic matters" (MCEA) or "all cost-related matters" (UCEA) and that,
in consideration of the economic benefits granted under the coalition economic
agreements, no party to either agreement could make "additional economic demands" (MCEA, Sec. 3) or "further cost-related demands" (UCEA, Sec. 3) during
the terms of the coalition economic agreements or during negotiations for the terms
of separate unit agreements. Since the agreements were substantially similar, the
impartial members of the Board of Collective Bargaining, sitting as an arbitration
panel, found it unnecessary to determine which agreement applied. Id. at 4-5, 20.
92. Id. at 23-24.
93. City of New York v. District Council 37, No. A-1302-81 (Office of Collective
Bargaining, Oct. 9, 1981) (Anderson, Collins, Eisenberg, Arbs.).
94. Id. slip op. at 1; see MCEA Sec. 11(a).
95. No. A-1302-81, slip op. at 8-9. An exception was made for employees in the
paramedic title because a salary review panel established under the MCEA had
mandated further bargaining for this group. Id. at 4, 9.
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While the fiscal crisis necessitated restraint in wage increases for
city workers, the disparity between public and private sector salaries
has prevented the city from recruiting and retaining an adequate
workforce in certain occupations. To address this problem, the MCEA
contained an innovative provision establishing a tripartite salary review panel "to review and make recommendations on the wage and
salary rates of any occupational group for which there are both recruitment and retention problems. '9 6 The salary review panel received applications covering fifty-six occupational groups and 28,379
employees.

°7

A salary review panel also was used to resolve a dispute between the
city and the New York State Nurses Association, the collective bargaining representative for employees in a variety of nursing titles in
city hospitals.9 8 The association maintained that, due to the low
salaries paid to city nurses as compared to salaries of nurses employed
in the private sector, there was a serious recruitment and retention
problem. 99 When negotiations became deadlocked, the dispute was
submitted to a one-man impasse panel, which recommended the creation of a tripartite salary review panel to consider the recruitment and
96. MCEA, Sec. 10.
97. Pursuant to the MCEA, written applications for consideration by the salary
review panel could be submitted by interested signatories within 120 days of approval of the agreement by the Financial Control Board. MCEA, Sec. 10. The panel,
which consisted of a member appointed by the Municipal Labor Committee, a
member appointed by the City of New York, and an impartial member chosen by the
other two, reviewed the applications submitted and conducted hearings on those
titles or occupational groups which it had determined warranted further consideration. Final recommendations were made on July 30, 1981 concerning some eighteen
occupational groups including, for example, accountants, computer operators, engineers and social workers. Decisions and Awards of the Salary Review Panel, July 30,
1981, at 1-2 (Rubin, Karetzky, Viani, Arbs.) and Addenda to Salary Review Decisions, dated Aug. 4, 1981, Sept. 25, 1981, Oct. 13, 1981, and Feb. 5, 1982; Pay Panel
Urges Awards to 18 Employee Groups, Chief-Leader, Aug. 7, 1981, at 1, col. 1 and
7, col. 2. These recommendations have been approved by the Deputy Mayor for
Operations, the Financial Control Board and the Department of Finance, and currently are being implemented. Leventhal OKs Panel Determinations, Chief-Leader,
Aug. 14, 1981, at 3, col. 1; Most Pay Panel Awards Delayed Until Jan. 29, ChiefLeader, Dec. 25, 1981, at 3, col. 4.
98. City of New York v. New York State Nurses Ass'n, No. 1-154-80 (Office of
Collective Bargaining, Jan. 23, 1981) (Wildebush, Arb.), afJ'd, City of New York v.
New York State Nurses Ass'n, No. B-3-81 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Feb. 3,
1981). This decision constitutes the "Final Opinion" of the impasse panel, and
includes the following: Recommendations of the Impasse Panel (Oct. 17, 1980),
Report of the Impasse Panel (Oct. 24, 1980), Recommendations of the Salary Review
Panel (Nov. 22, 1980), Supplementary Recommendations of the Impasse Panel (Dec.
4, 1980) and the Opinion of the Salary Review Panel (Jan. 12, 1981).
99. City of New York v. New York State Nurses Ass'n, No. 1-154-80, slip op. at 3
(Office of Collective Bargaining, Jan. 23, 1981) (Wildebush, Arb.).
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retention issue.100 The impasse panel retained jurisdiction, however,
to ensure that the salary review panel accomplished its intended purpose. This salary review panel recommended the payment of experience differentials to nurses with seven, ten and fifteen years of experience.1 0' Its recommendations were accepted by the impasse panel
which incorporated the salary review panel's recommendations in a
final opinion, issued on January 23, 1981.102
Although the fiscal crisis was largely responsible for the emergence
of coalition bargaining, this innovation is likely to endure even after
the fiscal crisis has ended. It is fair to assume that, for some occupations, public sector salaries will continue to lag behind private sector
salaries. A salary review panel will aid the city in its efforts to recruit
and retain an adequate and qualified workforce and will be especially
useful in light of the increasing number of specialized occupations for
which personnel are in short supply.
3. The City's Ability to Pay
a. Limitations on BargainingDemands
Traditionally, the city's ability to pay its employees was not a major
issue in collective bargaining because the power to levy taxes to finance wages was presumed to be unlimited. However, the fiscal crisis
necessitated certain restrictions on the city's taxing ability and reduced
the funds available to the city for the payment of wages. Since 1978,
however, when the state legislature amended the Financial Emergency Act of 1975, directing impasse panels to consider the city's
ability to pay wage increases before rendering an award,1 0 3 ability to
pay has been a significant factor in public sector labor negotiations in
New York City.
100. City of New York v. New York State Nurses Ass'n, No. 1-154-80, slip op. at 3
(Recommendations of the Impasse Panel, Oct. 17, 1980).
101. City of New York v. New York State Nurses Ass'n, No. 1-154-80, slip op. at 3
(Recommendations of the Salary Review Panel, Nov. 22, 1980) (Rubin, Karetzky,
Rooney, Arbs.).
102. City of New York v. New York State Nurses Ass'n, No. 1-154-80 (Final
Opinion, Jan. 23, 1981) (Wildebush, Arb.). The award of the citywide salary review
panel, established pursuant to the MCEA, recommended increases in minimum
salary rates, tuition reimbursements and uniform allowances for certain nursing titles
not covered by the arbitrator's award.
103. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 5408(3)(a), (h) (McKinney 1979). See note 19
supra and accompanying text. Even before the enactment of the FEA Amendments,
however, the NYCCBL prescribed that impasse panels consider "the interest and
welfare of the public" in rendering an award. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54,
§ 1173-7.0(c)(3)(b)(4) (1975). This factor has been interpreted consistently to include
the employer's financial ability to pay. For example, in Community Action for Legal
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As originally drafted, the ability to pay amendment included two
limitations on bargaining demands. It forbade any award which
would require an increase in the level of taxes above the level that
existed at the time the impasse arose, and any award which would
require a reduction in the level of municipal services. 0 4 However,
the second limitation was deleted from the final bill. In the 1980
negotiations for a citywide agreement, the unions and the city both
were reluctant to use the amended impasse procedures. 105 The city
may have been reluctant to risk an award which could be funded only
by further decreasing the level of municipal services, 106 while the
municipal unions may have felt that the ability to pay provision
precluding the city from financing a settlement by increasing the level
of taxes would be an obstacle to a fair decision by an impasse panel. In
review
addition, both parties may have wished to avoid de novo court
07
of the threshold determination of the ability to pay issue. 1
Impasse panel recommendations in New York City are final and
binding if not rejected or appealed by a party to the dispute within
prescribed time limits. 0 8 However, if implementation of any part of
an impasse award requires the enactment of a law, the provision does
not become binding until the appropriate legislative body enacts such
a law.10 9 Thus, if there are insufficient funds in the budget to cover a
recommended wage increase, the award may not be implemented
until the necessary appropriation is made. This clause, which has been
part of the NYCCBL since 1972, further restricts the power of the

Servs. Inc. v. Legal Servs. Staff Ass'n, No. 1-110-74, slip op. at 4-5 (Nov. 13, 1974),
the single-member impasse panel noted that:
[I] am bound by the requirements of the City Labor Law [section 11737.0(c)(3)(b)] which requires that I take into account the interest of the
public. This has come to mean the ability of the City to pay and the extent
to which services rendered may have to be curtailed if funds are unavailable.
104. See Committee Report, supra note 4, at 758.
105. Id.
106. Id. The authors note that the question of whether an impasse panel could
render legally an award which requires the city to fund an increase in wages or fringe
benefits by eliminating or decreasing present services remains unanswered.
107. Id. at 759. To date the 1978 FEA's de novo review procedure has not been
used by any party subject to the NYCCBL. The ability to pay provision is due to
expire on Dec. 31, 1982, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 5408(3)(i) (McKinney 1979).
108. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(e) (1975).
109. Id. This proviso applies equally to a final determination of the Board of
Collective Bargaining when it is called upon to review the report and recommendations of the impasse panel. Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(e).
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parties, an impasse panel, or the Board of Collective Bargaining, to
exceed the confines of the city's budget.110
b. Reconsideration of the Strike Weapon
The effect of the New York City fiscal crisis on the city's ability to
pay also has reduced the incidence of public sector strikes. Although it
is illegal for public employees in New York State to strike,"' there
have been a number of strikes in the past. In a time of fiscal constraint, however, engaging in a strike can be a futile exercise. Albert
Shanker, President of the United Federation of Teachers, recognized
this when, after a one-week strike of teachers in 1975, he observed
that "a strike is a weapon you use against the boss who has money.
This boss has no money." 112 While the fiscal crisis has not been the
sole cause of the decline in public sector strikes," 3 it has been a
significant factor along with the strict enforcement of the penalty
provisions of the New York State Taylor Law by the New York4 State
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and the courts."

110. Id.
111. N.Y. Civ. SEnv. LAW § 210(1) (McKinney 1973).
112. Teachers Vote to Return But Many Object to Pact; Schools Open Tomorrow,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1975, at 28, col. 5.
113. Another reason for the decline in strikes, which predates the fiscal crisis, is
the enactment of the state's Taylor Law in 1967, which imposes strict penalties and
forfeitures on a striking union. See N.Y. Civ. SEv. LAW §§ 210(2)(g) (mandatory
deduction of two days pay for each day an individual employee is on strike); 210(3)
(forfeiture of striking union's right to deduct membership dues and to deduct an
equivalent amount from the salaries of non-member unit employees for such time as
the State Public Employment Relations Board determines, including an indefinite
time) (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981). Still another factor contributing to the decline
in the number of strikes in the public sector may be the availability of impasse
arbitration.
114. See note 113 supra. In October 1981, PERB enforced Taylor Law penalties
against three New York City transit unions responsible for the 1980 strike, suspending
their dues deduction privileges for eighteen months. Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America v. New York City Transit Auth., 14 N.Y. PUB. EMp. REL. BD.
3074 (1981). In In re United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2, 14 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD.
3073 (1981), PERB upheld its 1976 suspension of the United Federation of Teachers' dues checkoff privileges, imposed as a penalty for the union's five-day strike in
1975. The state Judiciary Law, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 751 (McKinney 1975), specifies that
willful participation in a strike by a public employee union in violation of the Taylor
Law constitutes a criminal contempt punishable by a fine fixed by the court. In 1981,
a state supreme court enforced this provision against the transit unions for the 1980
strike and imposed substantial fines. New York City Transit Auth. v. Lindner,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1980, at 1, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), aff'd, N.Y.L.J. July 16,
1981, at 10, col. 4 (2d Dep't). In Health and Hosps. Corp. v. Committee of Interns
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III. The Impact of the Fiscal Crisis on
Municipal Unions and the Work Force
A. Job Security
Since the commencement of the fiscal crisis there has been a substantial reduction in the city's work force with twenty percent fewer
city employees in 1980 than in 1975.115 In addition, as of 1980, city
expenditures had been reduced by twenty-one percent." 6 Faced with
the threatened elimination of jobs, municipal unions agreed to forego
financial benefits, including wage increases, in exchange for promises
by the city not to lay off additional bargaining unit members for the
term of an agreement. 1 7 Prior to the fiscal crisis, both PERB and the
New York City Board of Collective Bargaining had held that elimina8
tion of jobs and layoffs were not mandatory subjects of negotiation."l
Beginning in 1975, however, unions demanded bargaining over the
related issues of job security provisions," 9 lay off procedures, 120 and
the impact of layoffs on employees who had been or were about to be
laid off. 121
The Board of Collective Bargaining first ruled, in City of New York
v. MEBA, DistrictNo. 1, Pacific Coast District,2 2 that, although the
decision to lay off employees is not a mandatory subject of negotiations, the impact of a lay off must be bargained. Specifically, the

and Residents, N.Y.L.J. May 8, 1981, at 7, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), the court
held the union in contempt for the strike of resident physicians in municipal hospitals
in 1981, and imposed fines of $175,000.
115. R. HORTON & M. McCORMICK, SETTING MUNICIPAL PRIORITIES: (1981), cited
in draft form in City of New York, Productivity Programfor New York City, at 28
(submitted to Financial Control Board Sept. 17, 1980).
116. Id.
117. Committee on Labor and Social Security, Impact of the Fiscal Crisis and the
State FinancialEmergency Act on the Structure and Scope of Collective Bargaining,
Part II, 32 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 462, 464 (1977).
118. City School Dist. of New Rochelle v. New Rochelle Fed'n of Teachers, Local
280, 4 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. Bo. 3060 (1971); District Council 37 v. City of New
York, No. B-1-70 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Feb. 26, 1970); Association of
Bldg. Inspectors v. Housing and Dev. Admin., No. B-4-71 (Board of Collective
Bargaining, Jan. 18, 1971).
119. City of New York v. MEBA, Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist., No. B-3-75 (Board
of Collective Bargaining, Feb. 6, 1975).
120. District Council 37 v. City of New York, No. B-18-75 (Board of Collective
Bargaining, June 16, 1975).
121. City of New York v. District Council 37, No. B-21-75 (Board of Collective
Bargaining, July 16, 1975), aff'd sub nom. City of New York v. Board of Collective
Bargaining, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1976, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
122. City of New York v. MEBA, Dist., No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist., No. B-3-75
(Board of Collective Bargaining, Feb. 6, 1975).
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board held that a job security provision which included language
committing the employer to attempt to retain all permanent per
annum employees and to re-hire such employees when vacancies occurred was not a mandatory subject of bargaining.123 However, the
board found that another element of the job security clause, requiring
that lay offs be discussed with the union before implementation, was a
mandatory subject. 124 The board held that a management decision to
lay off employees necessarily has a "practical impact" and that the
city was obligated to bargain immediately "with respect to those issues
over which the employer has discretion to act, and which relate to the
25
practical impact of [its] managerial decision to lay off employees." 1

123. Id., slip op. at 11-12. The board relied on the decision of the Public Employment Relations Board in City School Dist. of New Rochelle v. New Rochelle Fed'n of
Teachers, 4 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 3060 (1971), which held that an employer's
decision to make budget cuts and lay off employees is a non-mandatory subject of
bargaining. The board also applied NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 11734.3b, which gives the city the unilateral right "to relieve its employees from duty
because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons":
It is the right of the city, or any other public employer, acting through its
agencies, to determine the standards of services to be offered by its agencies; determine the standards of selection for employment; direct its employees; take disciplinary action; relieve its employees from duty because
of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; maintain the efficiency of
governmental operations; determine the methods, means and personnel by
which government operations are to be conducted; determine the content
of job classifications; take all necessary actions to carry out its mission in
emergencies; and exercise complete control and discretion over its organization and the technology of performing its work. Decisions of the city or
any other public employer on those matters are not within the scope of
collective bargaining, but, notwithstanding the above, questions concerning the practical impact that decisions on the above matters have on
employees, such as questions of workload or manning, are within the
scope of collective bargaining.
Id.
124. A demand for information and negotiation prior to implementation of layoffs
did not, in the Board's view, interfere with the employer's right to curtail or eliminate a service. No. B-3-75, slip op. at 12.
125. Id. at 14. See also City of New York v. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local
94, No. B-9-68 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Nov. 12, 1968), where the Board of
Collective Bargaining defined the term "practical impact" as an "unreasonably
excessive, or unduly burdensome workload, as a regular condition of employment."
The board held that the existence of a practical impact is a question of fact to be
determined by the board as a condition precedent to determining whether there are
any bargainable issues arising out of the impact. Id. at 4-5. The board made the
following conclusions: (1) Once the board determines that a practical impact exists,
it will require the city expeditiously to relieve the impact. The city may relieve the
impact on its own initiative through the exercise of its reserved management rights. If
it cannot thus relieve the impact, however, or chooses to offer changes in wages,
hours and working conditions as the means to alleviate impact, the city must bargain
with the union concerning such matters and, if no agreement can be reached, submit
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In District Council 37 v. City of New York,1 26 the Board of Collective Bargaining faced a similar scope of bargaining question with
respect to lay off procedures. Employees were notified that their
employment would be terminated. While there were collective bargaining agreements in effect, they did not specifically address the
manner in which lay offs due to budgetary factors were to be accomplished.1 27 The union contended that the city's unilateral termination
of employment resulted in a practical impact upon employees who,
because layoffs were not made in inverse order of seniority and because other procedures relative to the manner in which lay offs would
be effectuated were not applied, stood to lose jobs they otherwise
would retain. 28 The city asserted as an affirmative defense that
matters of layoff including the manner of implementation were out29
side the scope of collective bargaini*ng.1
In its decision, the board cited numerous private and public sector
precedents holding that an employer may unilaterally decide to lay off
employees for economic reasons, but that the effect of its decision on
employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 30 Although the
board dismissed the union's petition as premature, it did so without
prejudice to the right of the union to initiate bargaining with respect
to lay off impact issues.13 1 In the expectation that the union would

to mediation and/or impasse proceedings; (2) If the board determines that a practical impact exists and the city does not or cannot expeditiously relieve the impact, or
the union alleges that the city has failed to alleviate the impact through the exercise
of its reserved rights, the board will order an immediate hearing to determine
whether the impact remains. If the board finds that a practical impact continues to
exist, it shall order the city to bargain immediately with the union over the means to
be used to relieve the impact, including, for this purpose, areas of reserved management rights. If the parties cannot agree, an impasse panel shall be appointed to make
recommendations to alleviate the impact. Id.
126. No. B-18-75 (Board of Collective Bargaining, June 16, 1975).
127. Id., slip op. at 2.
128. Id. at 2-3.
129. Id. at 3-4.
130. Id. at 14-23. In the private sector, see, e.g., NLRB v. Dixie Ohio Express
Co., 409 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Thompson Transport Co., 406 F.2d 698
(10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. United Nuclear Corp., 381 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Royal Plating and Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Adams
Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); NLRB v.
Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961). In the public sector, see, e.g.,
Albany Police Officers Union, Local 2841 v. City of Albany, 7 N.Y. PUB. Emp. REL.
BD.
3078 (1974); Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 274 v. City of White Plains,
5 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 3008 (1972); New Rochelle Fed'n of Teachers v. City
School Dist. of New Rochelle, 4 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 3060 (1971).
131. No. B-18-75, slip op. at 37.

1982]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

seek such bargaining in response to additional lay offs, however, the
board resolved the legal issues raised by the petition, stating that:
(1) impact issues such as notice of future intended layoffs, order of
layoff, and order of recall of terminated employees are immediately
bargainable upon demand; (2) the per se duty to bargain over lay off
impact relates to employees either laid off or about to be laid off and
not to the remaining employees; and (3) the duty to bargain on
132
matters of practical impact can arise during the life of a contract.
33
In a subsequent case,
which was challenged by the city and upheld
by the Supreme Court, New York County, 1 34 the board reiterated its
holding that the practical impact of lay offs is a mandatory subject of
bargaining and ordered the city to negotiate with District Council 37
concerning lay offs necessitated by the fiscal crisis.
Although the fiscal crisis has made it more difficult for public
employers to honor job security provisions in collective bargaining
agreements, the New York Court of Appeals has held such provisions
to be enforceable. In Board of Education, Yonkers City School District v. Yonkers Federation of Teachers, 35 the court required the
board of education to submit to, arbitration the issue of employee lay
offs which were alleged to violate a job security clause in a collective
bargaining agreement. 36 The issue before the court was whether a
public employer is free to bargain about job security, a non-mandatory subject of bargaining, and submit disputes concerning job security to arbitration pursuant to the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. 3 7 The court relied on its holding in an earlier case, 38
and declared that a contract provision guaranteeing employees job
security for a reasonable period of time is not barred by statute,
132. Id. at 33-36.
133. City of New York v. District Council 37, No. B-21-75 (Board of Collective
Bargaining, July 16, 1975).
134. City of New York v. Board of Collective Bargaining, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18,
1976, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
135. 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976).
136. The Yonkers Board of Education and the teachers' union entered into a
collective bargaining agreement in Nov., 1974 prior to the enactment of the Financial Emergency Act, containing the following job security clause: "During the life of
this contract no person in this bargaining unit shall be terminated due to budgetary
reasons or abolition of programs but only for unsatisfactory job performance as
provided for under the Tenure Law." Id. at 272, 353 N.E.2d at 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
657.
137. Id. at 271, 353 N.E.2d at 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
138. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers'
Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S. 2d 427 (1975). There the court of
appeals held that parties may negotiate about non-mandatory subjects of bargaining
and, if they do so, are bound by their agreements on such matters.
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decisional law, or public policy. 139 The court therefore held that the
Yonkers school board could negotiate voluntarily concerning job security, agree to arbitrate disputes, and having so agreed, be forced to
arbitrate. 140
The court rejected the school board's argument that the Financial
Emergency Act,1 41 which acknowledged that Yonkers was in a state of
financial emergency, was a legislative expression of a public policy
that permitted the abolition of jobs regardless of a contractual grant of
job security.142 The court stated that the act evidenced no policy of
abrogating collective bargaining agreements or of abolishing teaching
positions. 143 Although the court acknowledged that not all collective
bargaining agreements or all job security clauses are enforceable under all circumstances, and that saving a municipality from bankruptcy may require the impairment of contractual obligations, it
concluded that "the collective bargaining agreement in question, negotiated before a legislatively declared emergency, short-term in
length, and indistinguishable from the city's other contractual obligations which remain enforceable, is not yet vulnerable to attack as in
violation of public policy." ' 144 Thus, the court drew a distinction
between allowing the city to ignore its wage obligations, 145 which
would result only in temporary monetary loss to employees, and
allowing the city to ignore its promises of job security, the consequences of which would be far more drastic.
B. Reduction in Manning Levels
Reduction in the work force necessitated by the fiscal crisis was the
subject of direct challenges by the PBA and the Uniformed Firefighters Association (UFA) .146 These unions objected to the city's announcements in 1975 of its intention to reduce levels of manning in the
police and fire departments.
139. 40 N.Y.2d at 271, 353 N.E.2d at 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
140. Id. at 272, 353 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
141. Ch. 868 [1975] N.Y. Laws 1405 (McKinney). See notes 6-16 supra and
accompanying text.
142. 40 N.Y.2d at 275, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 276, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
145. See Subway-Surface Supervisors' Ass'n v. New York City Transit Auth., ,14
N.Y.2d 101, 375 N.E.2d 384, 404 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1978) (court upheld wage freeze
provision of the FEA, allowing the city to ignore its pre-existing obligation to pay
wage increases); see notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
146. City of New York v. PBA, No. B-5-75 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Feb.
14, 1975); City of New York v. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 84, No. B-20-75
(Board of Collective Bargaining, July 16, 1975).
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With respect to the police, the city requested a determination by
the Board of Collective Bargaining as to whether its proposed withdrawal of a prior commitment to maintain "current policies" concerning the number of men assigned to precinct radio motor patrol cars
was within the scope of collective bargaining. 147 The city asserted
that it had the unilateral right to reduce the number of police officers
in a patrol car from two to one, pursuant to the management rights
clause of the NYCCBL.' 48 In City of New York v. Patrolmen'sBenevolent Association,' 49 the board upheld this right, relying on the statutory provision that management has the right "to determine the standards of services to be offered by its agencies" and "the methods, means
and personnel by which government operations are to be conducted." 1 50 The board noted, however, that the statute also provides
that "questions concerning the practical impact that decisions on the
above matters have on employees, such as questions of workload or
manning, are within the scope of collective bargaining."' 5' The
board found that the PBA's allegations that reductions in manning
levels would adversely affect the safety of policemen were sufficient to
order the city to bargain with the union to alleviate any practical
impact before implementing the plan.' 52 After the issuance of the
board's decision, the PBA and the city entered into negotiations concerning the proposed one-man patrol plan and ultimately agreed to
submit the matter to an impasse panel for resolution. The panel found
that there was no safety impact in the city's plan.' 53 Because the
panel's findings were not appealed to the Board of Collective Bargain-

147. The city also sought a determination as to whether its proposed withdrawal
of the "24-squad system," under which police officers worked 81/2 hour tours and had
more days off per year, was a mandatory subject of bargaining. City of New York v.
PBA, No. B-5-75, slip op. at 1-3.
148. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-4.3b (1975).
149. No. B-5-75.
150. Id. slip op. at 12, citing NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-4.3b
(1975); see note 123 supra.
151. Id.
152. No. B-5-75, slip op. at 13-14. In determining that the presence of safety issues
rendered the city's proposed reduction in manning bargainable, the Board of Collective Bargaining concurred with decisions of the New York State Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB). See, e.g., Albany Police Officers Union, Local 2841 v. City
of Albany, 7 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REV. BD. 3078 (1974) (demand for two men in patrol
cars held bargainable as affecting safety); Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 274
3008 (1972) (demand for
v. City of White Plains, 5 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REV. BD.
specified number of firemen on a fire truck held bargainable as related to safety).
153. PBA v. City of New York, No. 1-130-77, slip op. at 16 (Office of Collective
Bargaining, June 10, 1977) (Levin, Arb.).
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ing, the award became final and binding 54 and the solo patrol car
5
plan was implemented in stages beginning in 1977.1 5
In City of New York v. Uniformed FirefightersAssociation, Local
94,156 the board granted the UFA's request for arbitration of a grievance filed in response to the announced intention of the fire department to reduce manning below the minimum levels provided for in its
1973-74 collective bargaining agreement. This agreement was in effect pursuant to the status quo provisions of the NYCCBL.15 ' The
city argued that the manning level clause was nullified because the
1975-76 municipal budget reduced the funds available for fire department manpower.158 The UFA argued that the city cannot "legislate
away" a contractual obligation. 5 9 It cited a court of appeals decision
to the effect that mere financial hardship, however burdensome, does
not constitute grounds to excuse performance of a collective bargaining agreement. 6 0 The board agreed with the union, stating that
while the city has the right to determine the level of services needed
and what it can afford, it must honor the terms of an existing labor
contract for the duration of that agreement.'' Since the applicable
collective bargaining agreement dealt with the subject of manning,
the board found that this was a proper subject for arbitration.162

154. See NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(c)(4)(a) (1975 & Supp.
1981-82). As originally enacted in 1967, New York, N.Y., [1967] N.Y. Local Laws
449-50 (No. 53), § 1173-7.0(c) of the NYCCBL contained provisions for fact-finding,
but the recommendations that resulted were advisory only. Nevertheless, the City of
New York maintained a policy of voluntary compliance with impasse panel recommendations. The system of final and binding impasse arbitration provided for in the
current statute was enacted by the New York City Council in 1972. New York, N.Y.,

[1972] N.Y. Local Laws 158-160 (No. 2), codified at NEW

YORK,

N.Y.,

ADMIN.

CODE

ch. 54, §§ 1173-5.0(a)(8), -7.0(c)(3)(e), -7.0(c)(4), -7.0(f) (1975 & Supp. 1981-82).
155. See New York City Police Department, Operations Order No. 85, Oct. 27,
1977.
156. No. B-20-75 (Board of Collective Bargaining, July 16, 1975).

157. Id., slip op. at 5.

NEW YORK,

N.Y.,

ADMIN.

CODE

ch. 54, § 1173-7.0(d)

(1975), requires preservation of the status quo during a specifically delimited "period
of negotiations."
158. No. B-20-75, slip op. at 2-3.
159. Id.at 4.
160. Id., citing PBA v. City of New York, 59 Misc. 2d 556, 299 N.Y.S.2d 986
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afJ'd, 35 A.D.2d 697, 314 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1st Dep't 1970),
modified on other grounds and aft'd, 27 N.Y.2d 410, 267 N.E.2d 259, 318 N.Y.S.2d
477 (1971).
161. No. B-20-75, slip op. at 8. Cf. Yonkers Bd. of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of
Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976) (provisions of
collectively negotiated labor agreement held to be enforceable in spite of the fiscal
crisis); see notes 135-45 supra and accompanying text.
162. No. B-20-75, slip op. at 9.
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The designated arbitrator in the Firefighters' dispute found that
neither the lay offs nor the reductions in manning effectuated by the
city violated the collective bargaining agreement, but that the city's
right to reduce manning levels and to lay off personnel was "impliedly
restricted by levels of safety to the public and the level of reasonable
danger to the firemen.""' Noting that lay offs and manning reductions had left the fire department " 'wounded' but still effective," the
arbitrator determined that the city had exhausted its rights to reduce
personnel and manning levels to meet the fiscal crisis. 6 4 This award
65
was modified, however, on appeal.

163. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New York, No. A-479-75, slip op. at
13 (Office of Collective Bargaining, Feb. 15, 1976) (Schmertz, Arb.). At the time of
this controversy, the city had laid off 894 firefighters and had reduced the minimum
number of men per tour of duty from five to four in 162 engine companies; from six
to five in 29 ladder companies, in all squad companies, and in all rescue companies;
and from ten to nine in three combination fire companies.
164. Id. at 13-14.
165. The City of New York filed a petition seeking to modify Arbitrator
Schmertz's award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in
directing that there be no further layoffs. The Supreme Court, New York County,
agreed and granted the city's petition. City of New York v. Uniformed Firefighters
Ass'n, Local 94, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1976, at 8, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
Other municipalities in New York State are required to bargain concerning the
safety implications of reduced levels of manning. In City of Mount Vernon v.
Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 107, 11 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 3049 (1978),
the state PERB determined that a demand for the creation of a joint labor-management safety committee to cover "all matters of safety to the members of the Fire
Department covered under this . . . Agreement, including but not limited to the
total number of employees reporting to a fire and the minimum amount of employees
to be assigned to each piece of fire fighting apparatus," was a mandatory subject of
negotiation. Id. at 3076, 3077. Relying on its prior decision in Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New Rochelle, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 3078 (1977),
af'd, 11 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 7002 (2d Dep't 1978), PERB noted that, while
the assignment of personnel and vehicles to a fire may primarily concern issues of
manning, in a given factual situation, safety aspects may predominate. Therefore it
found that, on a case-by-case basis, questions of manning may be properly submitted
to a safety committee. 11 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 1 3049. See also City of New
Rochelle v. Crowley, 11 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD.
7002 (2d Dep't 1978), aJJ'g 10
N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD.
3078 (1977), and citing with approval three prior
decisions of PERB: City of Troy v. Troy Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 2304, 10
N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 3105 (1977); City of Newburgh v. International Ass'n of
Firefighters of Newburgh, Local 589, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD.
3001 (1977),
confirmed sub nom. International Ass'n of Firefighters v. Helsby, 59 A.D.2d 342,
399 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't 1977); City of White Plains v. White Plains PBA, 9 N.Y.
PUB. EMp. REL. BD.
3007 (1976). According to the appellate division, these cases
demonstrated that PERB had struck an "eminently reasonable balance" between the
conflicting considerations of management's right not to negotiate general questions of
manpower and a union's right to negotiate the formation of a committee to consider
specific safety considerations. 11 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 7002.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. X

After two years of assigning one man patrols to rank-and-file officers, the New York City Police Department instituted a program
providing for solo supervisory patrols by sergeants and lieutenants. 66
The Sergeants' Benevolent Association initiated improper practice and
grievance proceedings with the Board of Collective Bargaining and,
although the institution of the program was upheld as within the city's
management rights, the board found the program to have a practical
impact upon the safety of sergeants and lieutenants.' 6 7 Therefore, the
68
board ordered the parties to bargain concerning the safety issue.'
When the parties could not reach an agreement, an impasse panel was
appointed. Noting that it had the difficult task of "drawing lines
which will provide the maximum possible safety for the employees
while preserving to the fullest extent possible the city's statutory managerial right,"'6 9 the panel recommended safeguards to alleviate the
safety impact, 17 0 concluding that the supervisory patrol was no less
dangerous than the solo patrols for rank-and-file officers.' 7 ' Thus,
although the city has a right to reduce manning levels unilaterally,

166. Sergeants' Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, No. B-6-79, slip op. at 1-2
(Board of Collective Bargaining, May 24, 1979), aff'd sub nom. Sergeants' Benevolent Ass'n v. Board of Collective Bargaining, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1979, at 6, col. 2.
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
167. Shortly after the Sergeants' Benevolent Association filed its petition, the
Lieutenants' Benevolent Association intervened as a party. The board found that the
city's plan for supervisory solo patrols, unlike the plan for patrols by rank-and-file
officers, did not provide adequately for officer safety. No. B-6-79, slip op. at 22-23,
30.
168. Id. at 30.
169. Sergeants' Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, No. 1-145-79, slip op. at 20
(Office of Collective Bargaining, Oct. 3, 1980) (Feldblum, Zack, Collins, Arbs.).
170. These included:
1. the establishment of a "trigger point" of two-man patrol cars which
must be met for a precinct and tour before solo supervisory patrols
may be assigned;
2. the provision by the City of portable radios and shotguns, with
adequate training in the use of the latter as a condition precedent to
assignment to a solo patrol;
3. voluntary assignments to precede involuntary ones;
4. the use of solo patrol supervisors only as back-up units in emergencies
when no other back-up car is available;
5. the provision of drivers for supervisors who are unfamiliar with the
area they are assigned to patrol, for supervisors who are assigned to
more than one precinct; and for any supervisor on a given tour in the
event of an "unusual condition"; and
6. the requirement that the parties establish a joint Labor-Management
Committee on Safety.
Id. at 23-24.
171. Id.
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bargaining may be required where there is a practical impact on
safety.
C. Adoption of Innovative Management Concepts
1. Broadbanding
Broadbanding, which involves the consolidation of related job titles
into a single title, first was implemented in the city in 1977.172 A
broadbanded title typically consists of three assignment levels, each of
which corresponds to a predecessor title included in the new title. For
example, the former clerical titles of Administrative Assistant, Administrative Associate, and Senior Administrative Assistant were consolidated into the new title of Principal Administrative Associate which
has three assignment levels.1 73 An employee whose title is broadbanded may choose to remain in his old title or may take a reclassification examination which, while not an examination for promotion,
will qualify him to assume the duties of any level of responsibility
74
within the new title. 1
The advantage of broadbanding, from the employer's viewpoint, is
the flexibility afforded in assigning personnel. An employee generally
enters a broadbanded title at the level which corresponds to his former
civil service title and salary rate. The employer may assign such an
employee to a higher level without giving him an examination and
subsequently return him to the level of entry without showing that the
employee's performance was unsatisfactory. 75 In the face of a severely reduced workforce, the ability to assign employees to positions
in which they are needed at a given time, without the obligation of
continuing the assignment and higher salary rate when the need has
been fulfilled, allows for better management. Indeed, according to
the city, broadbanding has improved its delivery of services.176
172. Prial, BroadbandingStill an Issue, Chief-Leader, July 31, 1981, at 4, col. 3.
173. Resolution 77-43 of the New York City Personnel Director, adopted Nov. 9,
1977.
174. In the case of an employee whose title, prior to broadbanding, is equivalent
to the highest level of the broadbanded title, no examination is required. Reclassification to the new title is automatic. See, e.g., Resolution 78-29 of the New York City
Personnel Director, adopted July 12, 1978 (automatically reclassifying employees in
three parking meter and traffic control positions without requiring a new examination).
175. Note that the civil service law requirements that appointments be made by
selecting one of the three persons who are at the top of an eligibility list for a given
title established through competitive examination, N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAW § 61(1)
(McKinney 1973), and that persons holding such appointments may not be removed
except upon a showing of incompetency or misconduct, N.Y. Civ. SEiv. LAW § 75(1)
(McKinney 1973), are avoided in the broadbanding scheme.
176. Prial, Broadbanding Still an Issue, Chief-Leader, July 31, 1981, at 4, col. 3.
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From the employee's viewpoint, broadbanding is desirable because
it increases promotional opportunities by eliminating many of the
examinations normally required to reach the highest rungs of a career
ladder. However, with the exception of those unions which have
negotiated economic gains in return for their support of broadbanding
programs,' 7 7 the response of the city's unions generally has been negative. One of the objections to broadbanding raised by municipal
unions is that an employee who is assigned to a higher level of a
broadhanded title subsequently may be reassigned to the level equivalent to his former civil service title at the discretion of the employer.
The Communications Workers of America, Local 1180 and District
Council 37, Local 2627 sought, through collective bargaining, to
protect the employees they represented in several broadbanded administrative and data processing titles. When they failed to reach
agreements with the city, 178 the disputes were submitted to an impasse
panel.179 The recommendations of the panel, which were accepted
by the parties, provided a degree of salary protection for employees at
the higher levels of broadbanded titles. 8 0

177. District Council 37, for example, has struck such a bargain. Id.
178. Initially, the City of New York charged that the Communications Workers'
demand was outside the scope of mandatory negotiations since it would impact on
the city's right to assign employees within a broadbanded title to different duties.
The Board of Collective Bargaining determined this scope of bargaining question in
City of New York v. Local 1180, Communications Workers of America, No. B-19-79
(Board of Collective Bargaining, Nov. 16, 1979), in which it held that a demand for
salary protection concerns wages and is a mandatory subject, even though the
demand impacts on management's right to make assignments within titles.
179. Nos. 1-144-79/1-151-79 (Office of Collective Bargaining, June 24, 1980)
(Glushien, Arb.).
180. The impasse panel recommended that:
1. Employees who have served for three years and three months at an
assignment level above the lowest assignment level of a broadbanded
title may only be reduced in salary based upon their last performance
evaluation, . . . provided such overall performance evaluation rating is unsatisfactory. ...
2. Where an employee's salary has been reduced pursuant to paragraph
1, the Union may claim that the evaluation upon which it is based is
improper or incorrect and appeal such claim under the grievance
procedure of the Agreement. The Union shall have the burden of
showing the arbitrator that the evaluation was improper or incorrect.
3. The salary rate of an employee reassigned to a lower assignment level
in a broadbanded title whose salary rate is reduced shall receive the
rate such employee would have been receiving had the employee
served continuously in the lower assignment level.
Id., slip op. at 12-13. The protections afforded by the impasse panel award apply
only to employees in the titles covered by the award. By order of the Mayor,
however, the salary protection for employees who have served three years and three
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Despite the implementation of the broadbanding concept in city
government, a question still remains as to its legality. Only a few
court actions have been brought challenging the concept, however. In
Basoa v. Department of Corrections," "' a state supreme court justice
summarily upheld the city's power to consolidate civil service titles,
finding that the power to grade and establish classes or positions
8 2
granted to the city personnel director by the New York City Charter
is accompanied by the power to reclassify those positions. 8 3 The
court stated further that it did not appear that the consolidation of
titles would result in promotions without competitive examination or
that appointments pursuant to the consolidation would not be based
8 4
on merit and fitness.1
In Local 1508, Uniformed Park Officers v. City of New York, 85 a
more comprehensive decision was rendered, but one which still did
not decide the legality of the particular reclassification. The Supreme
Court, New York County, found that the New York City Director of
Personnel had authority to broadband and consolidate positions pursuant to section 52 of the Civil Service Law. 8 6 It explained, how-

months in a level of a broadbanded title higher than the entry level now applies to
most city employees. See Alternative Careerand Salary Pay Plan Regulations, Office
of the Mayor, The City of New York, Labor Relations Order 81/1, X (Aug. 12,
1980).
181. Index No. 07396/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), appeal dismissed, M-1508
(1st Dep't May 12, 1981).
182. N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 35, § 813(a)(2) (1976).
183. Index No. 07396/79, slip op. at 2, citing Green v. Lang, 18 N.Y.2d 437, 223
N.E.2d 19, 276 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1966) (city's reclassification of civil servants upheld on
grounds that administrative officers have power to assign duties and fix salaries
within a class achieved by competitive examination).
184. Index No. 07396/79, slip op. at 1; accord Seelig v. Department of Personnel,
Index No. 05637/80 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980), aJJ'd, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 1981, at 5,
col. 1 (1st Dep't). Moreover, the Basoa court noted that although appointments to a
title are permanent, assignments within a given title are mere "horizontal movements." Index No. 07396/79, slip op. at 2.
185. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28, 1979, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
186. Id. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 52(1) (McKinney 1973), entitled "Promotion
examinations" provides:
Filling vacancies by promotion. Except as provided in section fifty-one, vacancies in positions in the competitive class shall be filled, as far as practicable, by
promotion from among persons holding competitive class positions in a lower
grade in the department in which the vacancy exists, provided that such lower
grade positions are in direct line of promotion, as determined by the state civil
service department or municipal commission; except that where the state civil
service department or a municipal commission determines that it is impracticable or against the public interest to limit eligibility for promotion to persons
holding lower grade positions in direct line of promotion, such department or
commission may extend eligibility for promotion to persons holding competitive
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ever, that if the reclassification was in fact a reorganization, such that
the newly created positions included new duties as well as old ones,
the resultant vacancies could be filled only by promotional examination.1 8 7 Since the record before the court did not enable it to determine whether the reclassification in fact resulted in the assignment of
new duties or conferred superior supervisory status by way of higher
188
title and salary, a plenary trial was ordered.
The most recent case addressing the legality of broadbanding concerned the consolidation of various warden titles in the Department of
Corrections. In Lenihan v. City of New York,1 89 the Supreme Court,
New York County, held that the particular broadbanding in dispute
was lawful, on the grounds expressed in Basoa.1 0 There remained,
however, the issue of the legality of the reclassification examination,
an oral examination conducted over a two-day period which all competitors passed, and which the plaintiffs alleged was not a competitive
exam as required by law.""' The appellate division, noting that oral
examinations may be given in appropriate circumstances, modified
the decision and held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the
92
exam was not competitive.1
2. Civilianization
The "civilianization" program involves the replacement of uniformed employees in the departments of police, fire and corrections
with civilians in positions which do not specifically require the expertise of uniformed officers, and the reassignment of uniformed personnel to more "professional" duties. Civilianization, while not a new
concept in New York City, has been implemented much more extensively since the fiscal crisis. This program has resulted in financial
savings to the city and the improved delivery of essential services
because civilians are paid lower salaries than the uniformed personnel
they replace while the uniformed personnel are made available for the

class positions in lower grades which the department or commission determines
to be in related or collateral lines of promotion, or in any comparable positions
in any other unit or units of governmental service and may prescribe minimum
training and experience qualifications for eligibility for such promotion.

Id.
187. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28, 1979, at 5, col.
188. Id.
189. Index No. 22313/80 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
No. 12176 (1st Dep't Dec. 17, 1981).
190. Id., slip op. at 4. See notes 181-84
191. Index No. 22313/80, slip op. at 2.
192. Index No. 12176, slip op. at 9 (1st

2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
County 1981), modified and afJ'd, Index
supra and accompanying text.
Dep't Dec. 17, 1981).
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more critical positions. In addition to filling clerical positions, civilians serve, for example, as traffic enforcement agents, 19 3 tow truck
operators, 9 4 and telephone operators and radio dispatchers.1 95 In the
New York City Police Department, nearly twenty percent of the
employees are now civilians. 1 6
Civilianization has given rise to work jurisdiction claims by some of
the uniformed services unions-claims that the tasks being assigned to
civilians "belong" to the police officers' union or to the firefighters'
union. The program has been challenged in a series of cases before the
Board of Collective Bargaining, the Public Employment Relations
Board, and the courts. The Board of Collective Bargaining, in six
separate decisions, dismissed seventeen improper practice petitions
filed by the PBA,19 7 the union representing police officers in New York
City. In these petitions, the PBA alleged that the use of civilians to
operate police radio patrol cars; 198 issue parking summonses; 199 replace police personnel in the Management Information Services Division; 00 perform clerical, record keeping, time keeping, roll call, payroll, communications, statistical, analytical, and mechanical repair
functions; 2 0 1 replace a supervisory sergeant; 20 2 patrol the highways
and perform other functions relating to the enforcement of motor
vehicle laws 20 3 constituted improper employer practices under the
20 4
NYCCBL.
193. See PBA v. McGuire, No. B-8-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Mar. 20,
1980), aff'd, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 21, 1981, at 7, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
194. Id.
195. See PBA v. McGuire, No. B-26-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, July 23,
1980), aff'd, Index No. 16971/80 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County July 26, 1981).
196. City of New York, Productivity Programfor New York City submitted to
Financial Control Board, at 5 (Sept. 17, 1980); The Mayor's Management Report
submitted to the Board of Estimate and the City Council, at 48 (Sept. 17, 1981).
197. The Board of Collective Bargaining also dismissed a request for arbitration of
a grievance involving the use of a civilian to supervise uniformed personnel in the
Office of Manhattan Property Clerk. City of New York v. PBA, No. B-28-80 (Board
of Collective Bargaining, Sept. 4, 1980).
198. PBA v. City of New York, No. B-5-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Mar.
20, 1980).
199. PBA v. McGuire, No. B-8-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Mar. 20,
1980), aff'd, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 21, 1981, at 7, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
200. DeMilia v. McGuire, No. B-14-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, May 20,
1980).
201. PBA v. McGuire, No. B-26-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, July 23,
1980), aJ'd, Index No. 16971/80 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County July 26, 1981).
202. PBA v. McGuire, No. B-27-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, July 23,
1980), aJJ'd, Index No. 16972/80 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County July 26, 1981).
203. PBA v. McGuire, No. B-33-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Sept. 11,
1980), aJ'd, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1981, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
204. Section 1173-4.2a of the NYCCBL provides that:
It shall be an improper practice for a public employer or its agents:
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The board found that the civilianization programs challenged were
not improper employer practices and specifically did not constitute
employee discrimination for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in the union in violation of the NYCCBL.20 5 In
addition, the board noted that the PBA consistently failed to demonstrate that the replacement of police officers by civilians was detrimental to the PBA or that the bargaining unit for which the PBA is the
certified collective bargaining representative had been changed or
reduced in any way by the transfer of duties from uniformed to
civilian personnel. 206 The board also held that the city has no duty to
bargain over the reassignment of duties to civilians because such
20 7
reassignment is a matter of management prerogative.
The city's right to take unilateral action in areas of defined management prerogative is not unlimited. NYCCBL section 1173-4.3b, the
statutory management rights clause, upon which the board relied in
its decisions, requires the city to bargain concerning the practical
impact that managerial decisions have on employees. 20 8 Although the
PBA, in the above-mentioned cases, alleged that the civilianization
program had a practical impact upon its members,20 9 the board found
no evidence to support those allegations, and held that no issues were
presented which gave rise to a duty to bargain on the part of the
(1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of
their rights granted in section 1173-4.1 of this chapter;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
public employee organization;
(3) to discriminate against any employee for the purpose of encouraging
or discouraging membership in, or participation in the activities of, any
public employee organization;
(4) to refuse to bargain collectively in good faith on matters within the
scope of collective bargaining with certified or designated representatives
of its public employees.
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 (1975).
205. PBA v. McGuire, No. B-26-80, slip op. at 13 (Board of Collective Bargaining,.
Sept. 4, 1980).
206. Id., slip op. at 12.
207. Id. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-4.3b (1975), confers upon
the city the unilateral right to determine "the methods, means and personnel by
which government operations are to be conducted," and to "maintain the efficiency
of governmental operations." See note 123 supra. As the city asserted in PBA v.
McGuire, the Police Department, through its ongoing civilianization program, " '[i]s
attempting to deploy its total workforce in a fashion most conducive to effective,
efficient and safe delivery of police functions'." No. B-26-80, slip op. at 17.
208. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-4.3b; see notes 123 and 125
supra and text accompanying notes 125-34 supra.
209. The union also relied heavily on the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), on the
subject of subcontracting, drawing an analogy between the assignment of police
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city. 210 When the PBA initiated article 78 proceedings 21 1 seeking to
overturn four of the board's decisions in the civilianization cases, the
Supreme Court, New York County, consistently upheld the board's
determinations, finding that the board's construction of the NYCCBL
212
was rationally based.
The Board of Collective Bargaining decisions in the area of civilianization are consistent with relevant decisions of the state PERB. In
County of Suffolk v. Suffolk County Patrolmen'sBenevolent Association, Inc.,21 3 for example, PERB held that the transfer of police
officers from the teletype, firearms and central records sections to
other units within the County Police Department, and the replacement of those police officers with civilian employees, was within the
county's management prerogative. PERB affirmed the decision of its
hearing officer who found that the county's decision to civilianize was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining because: (1) police officers
were neither terminated nor laid off; (2) police officers suffered no
reduction in salary or benefits; (3) the total number of employees

officer duties to civilians and the contracting out of bargaining unit work to nonbargaining unit independent contractors. However, the Board of Collective Bargaining distinguished Fibreboard,which held that the employer's decision to subcontract
maintenance work was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Not only was there no
management rights clause at issue in the Fibreboardcase, but there was no showing
that bargaining unit members would be terminated as was the case in Fibreboard.
PBA v. McGuire, No. B-26-80, slip op. at 17-21. Further, the PBA cases involved a
transfer of function from one group of employees to another within the same city
agency, see No. B-26-80 (transfer of functions from police officers to civilians within
various precincts and units of Police Department), or from one agency to another, see
PBA v. McGuire, No. B-8-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Mar. 20, 1980) (transfer of ticketing and towing functions from Parking Enforcement Squad of Police
Department to Department of Traffic); PBA v. McGuire, No. B-33-80 (Board of
Collective Bargaining, Sept. 11, 1980) (transfer of functions, including enforcement
of motor vehicle laws from Traffic Division of Police Department to Department of
Traffic), rather than the subcontracting of an entire operation to a non-city employer.
210. See, e.g., PBA v. McGuire, No. B-33-80, slip op. at 11-12, 19 (Board of
Collective Bargaining, Sept. 11, 1980).
211. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1981), provides the vehicle
for obtaining judicial review of decisions of administrative bodies, including those of
the Board of Collective Bargaining.
212. In re PBA, N.Y.L.j., Apr. 21, 1981, at 7, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afJ'g
PBA v. McGuire, No. B-8-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Mar. 20, 1980); PBA
v. McGuire, Index Nos. 16971/80 and 16972/80 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981), aff'g
PBA v. McGuire, No. B-26-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, July 23, 1980) and
PBA v. McGuire, No. B-27-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, July 23, 1980); In re
PBA, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1981, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aJJ'g PBA v.
McGuire, No. B-33-80 (Board of Collective Bargaining, Sept. 11, 1980).
213. 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 3123 (1979), appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y. PUB.
EMP. REL. BD.
7007 (1980).
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within the Suffolk PBA's negotiating unit was unchanged; (4) the
positions in question were clerical or instructive, rather than law
enforcement in nature; and (5) the Police Department had determined that satisfaction of rigid qualifications for employment as a
214
police officer was not necessary for filling these positions.
A more recent case, City of Albany v. Albany Police Officers'
Union,215 involved allegations by the union that the City of Albany
had violated its obligation to negotiate in good faith by unilaterally
transferring nineteen police officers from work involving communications, towing and the issuance of parking tickets and hiring civilians to
perform this work. PERB affirmed the hearing officer's decision 216
that there was no violation of the statutory duty to bargain because
the reassignments were motivated only by a desire to utilize police
officers more efficiently and by a determination that employees who
could be given such responsibilities did not have to meet the requirements for appointment as police officers. Noting that the determination of job qualifications is a well-established management right, and
that the record was devoid of allegations of a practical impact on the
terms and conditions of employment of police officers, PERB dis21 7
missed the complaint.
The PERB decisions as well as those of the Board of Collective
Bargaining recognize that government must be free to act unilaterally
in certain areas in order to provide the best possible services to its
citizens at the lowest possible cost. This is especially true in a time of
fiscal constraint. It is clear, however, from the decisions of both
agencies, that if a practical impact on the working conditions of
bargaining unit members results from management's decision, the
employer will be ordered to bargain concerning the alleviation of this
impact.
Currently pending in Supreme Court, New York County, is a case
in which the Lieutenants' Benevolent Association has challenged New
York City's civilianization program as a violation of the New York
State Constitution and the Civil Service Law, rather than as an
improper labor practice under the NYCCBL. 21 8 The plaintiffs in the
action seek to enjoin the city from appointing civilians, or any individ-

214. 12 N.Y. PuB. EMP. REL. BD. 4561, at 4625-26 (Hearing Off. 1979).
215. 13 N.Y. PUB. Emp. REL. BD.
3011 (1980).
216. 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 4563 (Hearing Off. 1979).
217. 13 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 3011 (1980).
218. Gebhardt v. City of New York, No. 4188/81 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, filed
Feb. 13, 1981).
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ual other than a lieutenant, 219 to several enumerated positions in the
New York City Police Department.2 20 The union contends that lieutenants previously assigned to these positions were assigned on the
basis of promotional examination and that their replacement by persons not so examined violates the New York State Constitution 22' and
the State Civil Service Law. 22 2 A motion to dismiss the action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction was denied. 223 Thus, a ruling by the
Supreme Court, New York County can be anticipated in this novel
form of challenge to the civilianization concept.
IV. Conclusion
Although collective bargaining has been considered by some to be a
cause of the New York City fiscal crisis, there is abundant evidence
that bargaining has contributed to the ongoing solution of the problem. The major lesson to be learned is that collective bargaining works
in adversity as well as in prosperity. It is an adaptable process which
has accommodated the substantive and structural changes necessi-

219. According to the Lieutenants' Benevolent Association, Detective Lieutenants
in command of precinct detective units have been replaced by police sergeants. This
replacement, like the replacement by civilians, is alleged to violate Article V of the
New York State Constitution and § 61 of the New York Civil Service Law. Summons
and Verified Complaint at 11-12, Gebhardt v. City of New York, No. 4188/81 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County, filed Feb. 13, 1981). See notes 221-22 infra.
220. These positions are: Administrative Lieutenant in the 50th Precinct, Lieutenant in the Identification Section of the Police Department, Lieutenant assigned to the
Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Community Affairs, Detective Lieutenant in
the Borough of Queens Detective Area, Detective Lieutenant in command of precinct
detective units, and Director of Employee Services. Summons and Verified Complaint, Gebhardt v. City of New York, No. 4188/81.
221. N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state and all of the civil divisions
thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made according to merit and fitness to
be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination which, as far as practicable,
" Id.
shall be competitive ....
222. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 61(2) (McKinney 1973) provides:
No person shall be appointed, promoted or employed under any title not
appropriate to the duties to be performed and, except upon assignment by
proper authority during the continuance of a temporary emergency situation, no person shall be assigned to perform the duties of any position
unless he has been duly appointed, promoted, transferred or reinstated to
such position in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and the
rules prescribed thereunder. No credit shall be granted in a promotion
examination for out-of-title work.
Id.
223. Gebhardt v. City of New York, No. 4188/81 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 15,
1981).
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tated by the fiscal crisis and survived. But the bargaining process has
not merely survived-it has become a critical factor in the city's fiscal
survival and continuing recovery.
Collective bargaining has facilitated the implementation of costsaving measures in an atmosphere of cooperation between the city and
the unions. When the city could not afford to pay a negotiated wage
increase, most municipal unions agreed to a deferral of the increases.
The unions also agreed to a number of "givebacks" to aid in the city's
response to the crisis. Among these were an agreement not to oppose
the expiration of state legislation requiring the city to pay one-half of
the pension contributions of its employees and an agreement to forego
previously negotiated fringe benefits.
As a result of the fiscal crisis, there has been increased participation
by labor unions in the governmental process. Even in areas of acknowledged management prerogative, management and labor have
both had a role in the determination of certain aspects of the employment relationship. Examples of this are the one-man patrols for police
officers and sergeants and two-man sanitation trucks which have been
introduced as a more efficient use of manpower.
The process of collective bargaining in a time of fiscal constraint
also has made municipal unions more aware of how government
functions. Labor organizations now realize that they cannot be indifferent to the city's financial plight. Increasingly, unions have accepted
a degree of responsibility for the city's fiscal survival by holding
themselves accountable for the cost-effective delivery of public services.
Participation by labor in the affairs of government is not new,
however. Union support traditionally has been solicited in order to
gain legislative approval of budgets and other measures affecting city
government. What is new is the degree of cooperation that the city
and the municipal unions have achieved as a result of the fiscal crisis.
Whether the current level of cooperation will evolve into a continuing
policy of codetermination is uncertain. For the present, it remains in
the public interest that the city and the unions be willing to solve
common problems through constructive collective bargaining.

